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Findings of cross-cultural psychology suggest that different approaches to rule enforcement 
have cultural roots. Individualist societies have established a rule of law, in which rules 
prevail; collectivist societies have a rule of man, which allows discretionary rule 
enforcement, which, in turn, is recognized as an obstacle to sustained increases in 
productive long-term investment in developing countries. This paper presents a model that 
offers a unified framework to explain rule enforcement as social optimization processes in 
both individualist and collectivist societies and, on this basis, highlights the essential 
differences between a rule of law and a rule man (i.e., between rules and discretion). The 
paper uses this framework to show that cross-country variations in rule enforcement are 
explained to a considerable extent by cultural values. The paper then uses the framework to 
show how the imported multi-stage rule enforcement institutions based on separation of 
powers in vertically-oriented collectivist societies, unlike in the individualist societies from 
which they originate, might not ensure as low a degree of discretion as intended. Finally, the 
paper uses these results to explore practical ideas that would help collectivist societies 
benefit from rule enforcement with low discretion. 
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One of the under-researched topics in economics, particularly in its analysis of 
institutions and institutional change, is how collectivism and individualism—two 
different systems of values—affect institutions.1  These two systems of values are 
different. The following two passages by Rawls and the government of Singapore 
describe well the essence of the differences: 
Each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on 
justice  …  which even the welfare of every one else cannot 
override.  …  Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made 
right by a greater good shared by others (Rawls 1999: 24-5). 
Nations before [ethnic] community and society above self … Consensus 
instead of contention  …  (Government of Singapore, quoted in 
Huntington 1996: 319). 
Collectivism here refers to cultural values, not a political ideology. A society may be 
driven by collectivist values, without collectivizing production. Among a variety of 
different behavioural implications of these sets of values are those for inter-group 
relations and use of rules. Research by Hofstede (1997) and other cross-cultural and 
social psychologists suggests that collectivist societies tend to experience (i) strong 
inter-group rivalry (or factionalism) and (ii) a high degree of discretion in rule 
enforcement, much more so than in individualist societies.  
Their studies note that collectivist societies have developed a rule of man; individualist 
societies, a rule of law.2 The two value systems have different ideals for governance: 
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these 
clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public goods. 
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm (Hamilton 1787). 
Confucianism traced back the ordering of a national life to the regulation 
of the family life and the regulation of the family life to the cultivation of 
the personal life (Lin Yutang 1938: 21). 
The former stresses the importance of rules, the latter highlights the importance of 
enlightened leaders.  
                                                                                                 
1  Different behavioural implications of individualist and collectivist cultural values are well established 
in cross-cultural and social psychology. Their implications, however, are not widely analysed or 
discussed in economists’ research. Neoclassical economics, in general, assumes that human beings are 
rational individualists. Hayek (1948) has provided an analysis of the implications of individualism for 
market economic order and efficiency, but not a comparative analysis of individualism, on the one 
hand, and collectivism, on the other, the latter as it exists in the non-western civilizations in 
conjunction with a formal market order. New institutional economists have criticized neoclassical 
economics for its inadequate usefulness as tools to analyse long-term changes in the developing world 
(e.g., North 1994). Greif (1994) is among a handful of economists who have explicitly compared the 
implications of these two cultural values for the manner in which societies organize their institutions. 
2  See, for example, Hofstede (1997), and Berry et al. (1992).  
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Both of these consequences of cultural collectivism—inter-group conflicts and 
discretionary rule enforcement—can have significant negative effects on how a society 
develops sound institutions.3 In their interactions, rival groups in a collectivist society, 
by trying to promote their factional interests, end up undermining society’s chances to 
promote encompassing interests, thus harming their own interests. This is a standard 
result for games of prisoners’ dilemma (PD). Many economic and political reforms have 
elements of PD games. Rival groups in a collectivist society, by choosing—to promote 
their own interests—defection rather than cooperation, damage their collective interests 
and thus their own interests. While both individualist and collectivist individuals and 
groups face PD games, collectivist values can intensify inter-group conflicts (see Chu 
2004). 
Cross-cultural psychologists point out that culturally collectivist societies tend to be 
hierarchical (i.e., have a large power distance, or are authoritarian), in which leaders and 
other rule enforcers with paternalist ideals tend to use a high degree of discretion in 
interpreting and enforcing rules. This often leads to unintended consequences by 
reducing the predictability and transparency of rules. Rules in this context are formal 
rules as analysed in new institutional economics, which defines institutions as rules of 
the game and as comprising both formal and informal rules.  
More recent research in social psychology has suggested that the power distance 
dimension is independent of the individualism-collectivism dimension. Therefore, both 
individualist and collectivist societies may have various degrees of horizontal and 
vertical orientation, thus having different degrees of power distance.  
While cross-cultural psychologists’ results, based on observations, surveys and 
statistical analysis, are insightful, they do not offer formal models, which can enrich the 
understanding and discussion of the analytical results. This paper (i) presents a formal 
framework to analyse rule enforcement and highlight how rules and discretion arise, 
(ii) uses  cross-country  statistical data and the analytical framework to test the 
differences between rules-based and discretion-based enforcement, and (iii) reviews 
some practical experiments aimed at reducing the degree of discretion in rule 
enforcement in the context of the analytical framework. 
Rules in this paper, as in new institutional economics, comprise both formal rules (e.g., 
laws, policies, and regulations) and informal rules (e.g., customs, conventions and 
norms). They are not merely laws. Therefore, rules in this paper are broader than laws, 
and rule-making agencies are broader than the legislative branch. 
2  Vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism 
Cross-cultural psychologists highlight behavioural implications of a number of 
dimensions of culture. 4  As noted, individualist and collectivist cultures engender 
different values and behavioural norms in some respects. Individualist societies value 
                                                                                                 
3  The ideas in this note, in part, are based on the results reported in Chu (2003). 
4  See Chu (2004, 2003) for further details.  
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the interest of the individual, compared with that of the group, while collectivist 
societies value the interest of the group, compared with that of the individual. 
Individualism is widespread in countries of western civilization; collectivism in many of 
the rest. While individualism-collectivism is a matter of degree, that it is an obvious 
distinction is firmly established in psychology. For example, Feldman (2001: 475) 
states: 
Are you often influenced by the moods of your neighbours? Do you 
think people should take their parents’ advice in determining their career 
plans? ... If you answer yes to questions such as these, you may hold a 
view of the world that is dissimilar from that of most people in the 
dominant North American culture … 
A large/small power distance, another cultural dimension, makes formal and informal 
institutions more/less hierarchical. In this regard, research in cross-cultural and social 
psychology offers two strands of results: 
a)  Hofstede (1997) has noted that a collectivist society tends to be vertically 
oriented and have a large power distance—a tendency for members of a 
society to accept inequality—whereas an individualist society tends to be 
horizontally oriented and have a small power distance, but noting that there are 
exceptions. Hofstede’s research suggests that, some among western countries, 
particularly France and Belgium, while individualist, are characterized by a 
relatively large power distance, while most other individualist countries have a 
relatively small power distance. Collectivist countries tend to be characterized 
by a large power distance. 
b)  Recently, however, researchers note that different societies can have four 
different value orientations: horizontal and vertical individualism (H-I and V-I) 
and horizontal and vertical collectivism (H-C and I-C).5 The results of these 
recent studies point to the possibility for some of individualist and collectivist 
societies to be vertically and horizontally oriented. Vertical orientation, more 
so than horizontal orientation, tends to tolerate unequal outcomes in the 
distribution of power and income. In individualist societies, vertical orientation 
manifests itself by having people accept unequal outcomes, for example, in 
income distribution, as in the US, if they result from, for example, market rules. 
In contrast, northern European countries tend to tolerate less of these outcomes 
and use redistributive government policies to promote a greater degree of 
equity. In collectivist societies, vertical orientation manifests itself by having 
groups tolerate domination by authoritarian leaders. While leaders receive 
more rewards than the rest in a group, they are responsible for safeguarding the 
welfare of those they lead. In contrast, some groups (e.g., a small community) 
in a collectivist society do not have any hierarchy, and their members interact 
as equals. 
In a world of societies characterized by these four value orientations, the individualism- 
collectivism distinction determines whether a society has a rule of law (rules) or a rule 
of man (discretion), but rule enforcement may also be horizontal or vertical, depending 
                                                                                                 
5  For example, Gannon (2001); Nelson and Shavitt (2002).  
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on the extent to which the authorities or rule enforcers are more or less equally or 
unequally distributed.6 
Are the systems of rules and discretion really different? A certain degree of discretion is 
an inevitable phenomenon that accompanies rule enforcement in any society. That 
different societies enforce rules differently, however, is quite obvious from casual 
observations. As shown later in this paper, that the wide range of degrees of discretion 
is related to societies’ values is statistically supported. The following examples of what 
discretion means in practice are drawn and synthesized from a number of episodes in 
collectivist societies, with some modifications, but without altering the essential facts: 
a)  A prime minister breaks law to pursue the administration’s campaign promise 
and claims that the action was aimed at ‘promoting national interests’. 
b)  After indicting politicians for accepting illegal campaign contributions from 
large corporations, prosecutors decide not to indict corporation chiefs who 
made illegal contributions because, in their view, prosecuting a large number 
of business executives would harm the national economy. 
c)  Shortly after prosecutors have indicted and jailed senior officers in a campaign 
for receiving a large amount of illegal campaign contributions, a defeated 
candidate in a parliamentary election issues an apology to the voters on behalf 
of the campaign and suggests that as head of the campaign, s/he, not the 
subordinates, should be indicted and jailed. To this assertion, the prosecutors 
respond by saying that they have no evidence that implicates the candidate in 
soliciting illegal contributions. 
d)  A finance minister violates existing rules and decides to grant tax exemptions 
to selected corporations ‘to promote exports’. 
e)  Faced with scattered evidence of many companies’ significant under-reporting 
of taxable incomes in a region, tax administration officials decide not to press 
for audits of the companies in the region because the region’s economy is 
down. 
f)  Local police do not stop cars for breaking traffic regulations by crossing a red 
light because there are so many of them. 
3  A model of rule enforcement 
A high degree of discretion in rule enforcement can have significant negative 
implications for productive economic activities and, therefore, for economic growth. 
Research has shown that, for allocative efficiency and sustained growth, rules should 
not only be efficient, but also be enforced with minimal discretion. Discretionary rule 
enforcement would obviously make efficient rules inefficient and unpredictable. This 
gives rise to two questions: (i) How can one contrast the differences between discretion 
                                                                                                 
6  Why have individualist societies developed a rule of law and collectivist societies a rule of man is an 
interesting question. This paper, however, does not address this question.   
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and rules in rule enforcement analytically and test the differences empirically across 
countries? (ii) If discretionary rule enforcement is an inevitable result of collectivist 
values, and if discretion is an obstacle to achieving allocative efficiency and growth, 
how does a collectivist society move toward nondiscretionary rule enforcement? What 
are key elements of a rule enforcement system that would have small chances for 
discretion? 
This section presents a model that explains how a society enforces rules and how it 
reflects values in rule enforcement processes. The model can highlight how individualist 
and collectivist values shape rule enforcement processes and how vertical and 
horizontal orientations affect rule enforcement outcomes. The paper uses the model to 
show the essential differences between rules and discretion and uses cross-country data 
on values and rules to test the hypothesis that values are indeed associated with rules. 
In line with Hofstede’s original findings, this paper bases its empirical analysis on the 
premise that collectivist societies tend to be vertically oriented. The theoretical model 
presented in the paper, however, is general and flexible enough to show, in a unified 
framework, how collectivist and individualist values and horizontal and vertical 
orientations shape rule enforcement outcomes. This feature of the model is useful to 
highlight how vertically oriented collectivist values are particularly responsible for a 
high degree of discretion and what institutional features would be needed to reduce 
discretion. 
3.1  Rules versus discretion 
An analytical approach to highlighting the differences between rules and discretion may 
proceed along the following lines: 
A rule and the outcome of its enforcement 




it  =  a + bxit + e it (1) 
In Equation (1), the rule determines the relationship between yit and xit for individual i 
(i  = 1,2, 3, …, I)—the ith member of a group of agents who are required to observe the 
                                                                                                 
7  Rules versus discretion may be relevant for how society enforces informal rules, but is more relevant 
for enforcement of formal rules. The model here, therefore, assumes that rules are formal rules. The 
‘rules versus discretion’ question discussed in this paper refers to different approaches to enforcing a 
rule for different individuals and is, in some respects, different from and, in some other respects, 
similar to the ‘rules versus discretion’ question in macroeconomic policy. The question in the context 
of macroeconomic policy concerns implications for macroeconomic aggregates, such as aggregate 
income and overall price. The question in this paper concerns implications for efficiency and equity 
for different individuals or organizations. The two questions share some similarities, however. For 
example, a predictable countercyclical policy rule may not be effective. Similarly, certain rules and a 
predictable discretionary enforcement of rules may engender agents’ effort to evade the rules’ 
negative impact on them. This is, however, the maximum extent of similarity between the two.  
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rule—and for time t, but the relationship holds exactly only in a special case where 
eit = 0, in which case the rule is enforced exactly.8 
In this context, the value of yit, say, y
*
it =a + bxit, defined by the rule may be considered 
to be an optimal value of yit on some grounds (e.g., on efficiency and/or fairness 
grounds) arrived at via a social optimization process, independent of who is in charge of 
rule enforcement. Significant deviations from this rule imply inefficiency and/or 
inequity in some sense. Focusing on the enforcement aspect of rules, this paper 
addresses neither why they are optimal, nor how the society makes rules;9 it addresses 
only how the society enforces formal rules that have been established. 
Equation (1) may have a number of practical interpretations:10 
a)  With a binary dependent variable (i.e., 1 or 0), embedded into, say, an 
appropriate probit function, it may represent how a highway police  officer 
enforces a speed limit (e.g., to stop or not to stop a speeding car?); in this case, 
i represents the ith of the cars that come into a police  officer’s view on 
a highway. Or it may represent how a public prosecutor’s office enforces 
a campaign financing law; it has to determine whether the seriousness of a 
violation warrants an indictment. 
b)  With a = 0 and b = a positive fraction of 1, it may be a flat-rate corporate 
income tax rule,11 where i represents the ith taxpayer. 
c)  It may also be a sentencing rule that relates the seriousness of a crime to the 
duration of imprisonment. In this case, i represents the ith defendant being 
sentenced for a crime. 
In general, in all societies, including individualist ones, for a variety of reasons, the 
outcome of rule enforcement differs through time and among the agents required to 
                                                                                                 
8  Note that the rule may include special treatment of different individuals for special circumstances. For 
example, an individual income tax law may include a provision that exempts poor families and those 
living in an area hit by a natural disaster from filing their tax returns. It may also include rules aimed 
at dealing with a variety of well-identifiable contingencies that are not predictable for specific 
taxpayers.  
9  To a large extent, the whole body of literature concerning economic policy, including macroeconomic 
and microeconomic policy, optimal taxation, public expenditure policy, addresses this question. 
10 Note that not all discretionary deviations of the outcome from a de jure rule is symmetric. For 
example, speed limits as enforced by a police officer in a discretionary manner will only exceed the 
legal limit (e.g., 90km/hr). In this case, uit and eit will only be positive, and will have nonzero means. 
On the contrary, tax payments under discretionary tax administration cannot normally exceed de jure 
tax obligations, unless the enforcer is truly an arbitrary despot. In some other cases, however, 
deviations may be either positive or negative. For example, a sentencing rule may define a norm 
around which a positive or a negative deviation may be allowed, although the rule may stipulate a 
ceiling. Even a ceiling rule (e.g., a speed limit) may intend to allow a certain deviation in practice. For 
example, a de facto limit (designated for enforcement purpose) of a de jure speed limit of 90 km/hr 
may be 100 km/hr, around which police officers are allowed to exercise some discretion. In this case, 
uit and eit may be either positive or negative, although their mean still may not be zero. 
11 x it would be the taxable income of the ith corporation.  
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observe it. Rule enforcers in a collectivist society are particularly discretionary. Possible 
reasons for discretion include the following:12 
a)  Fundamentally, values in a collectivist society tend to attach importance to 
ruler’s (or enforcer’s) judgement in comparison to the rules. Particularly in a 
collectivist society with vertical orientation, rule enforcers, who have authority, 
also tend to be authoritarian. A collectivist society does not necessarily view 
rulers’ discretion as negatively as an individualist one does. The society tends 
to tolerate enforcers’ discretion and accept or even demand enlightened 
enforcers’ discretion.  
b)  There are a number of possible other overlapping reasons for discretion. Each 
of the following cases will give rise to discretion in both collectivist and 
individualist societies, but more so in collectivist societies, where a rule of man 
prevails, than in individualist societies, where a rule of law prevails. 
i)  Enforcing rules requires enforcement costs. It is in general not possible 
to catch all speeding cars, tax evaders, regulation violators, or other 
lawbreakers. A tax administration office does not have the resources to 
audit all the tax returns. Under a rule of law, however, greater efforts and 
resources will be spent on enforcing rules faithfully than under a rule of 
man. Many formal rules (e.g., constitutions, tax laws, election laws, etc.) 
in the culturally collectivist developing world have been ‘imported’ from 
the developed world.13 These imported formal rules may not always be 
securely nested in the informal norms in the developing world. This 
discrepancy between formal rules and informal norms tends to engender 
high enforcement costs and discretion.14 
ii)  Enforcer’s principles may not be in line with the existing rule. The 
enforcer may not personally endorse the intentions of a rule. A country’s 
president may not endorse a certain provision of an election law enacted 
by the legislature that may be dominated by an opposition party. It may 
have been enacted during the term of his or her predecessor or, as often is 
the case, may have been ‘imported’ from another country. Changing the 
provision of the law, keeping it and not enforcing it, and enforcing it in a 
discretionary manner have different political benefits and costs. Faced 
with such a law, a president in a country with a well-established rule of 
                                                                                                 
12 See O’Connor (2004) for a characterization of restrained discretion under a rule of law as a rule 
enforcer’s judgement, choice, discernment, liberty, and license. Discussing police discretion, 
O’Connor offers three causes of discretion: factors related to the offender, situation, and system.  
13 An obvious example is the introduction of a formal land title system in a rural Kenyan community, 
where land traditionally had been communally owned and used. A modern formal system of property 
rights did not work well because it clashed with traditional values and norms (Ensminger 1997). Many 
formal rules in the developing world (constitutions, VAT laws, budget laws, etc.) quite often have 
been designed by or in consultation with western experts, who have made their best to alter the rules 
to function effectively in an alien environment, but may not be successful all the time.  
14 Alien, off-the-shelf, colonial rules uniformly introduced by a heterogeneous set of small societies with 
diverse indigenous rules would surely have high u’s and e’s in general and when they are enforced by 
local enforcers in particular. In the US, the enforcement problem resulting from the lack of compatibility 
between the formal institutions that emerged from the Constitutional Convention and the informal norms 
of the south was so severe that the tension could be resolved only with a violent war.  
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law may try to change the provision, but still will be obligated to enforce 
the provision faithfully until it is amended or revised. A president in a 
society where a rule of man is practised may simply choose to enforce it 
in a discretionary manner. 
iii)  Finally, corruption matters. Research has shown that a system of 
discretionary rule enforcement gives rise to corruption. And corruption 
may engender discretion. 
Given a rule, its enforcement in any society is a process of interactions among a number 
of interested parties, which may include: 
a)  those (e.g., police officers, tax administrators, prosecutors, judges, or tyrants) 
who are directly in charge of enforcing the rule (i.e., primary enforcers), 
b)  those (e.g., automobile drivers, taxpayers, criminals, and citizens) who are 
required to observe it, and  
c)  others (e.g., jurors, defence attorneys, the public, the press, and NGOs and 
other pressure groups). 
The outcome of rule enforcement is the end result of interactions—some taking longer 
than the others—among these parties, some obviously having more inputs or influences 
than others in the process. 
In a strictly rules-based society, eit,  in principle, could be zero (no exception or 
discretion), although this is not a realistic case in practice. In a society that enforces 
rules with a high degree of discretion, eit would be large. In a one-man tyranny, eit in all 
substantive cases would largely represent the tyrant’s intentions, whims, and interests.15 
Rule enforcer’s view of how the rule should be enforced 
An important feature of discretionary rule enforcement under a rule of man is the 
important role of the individuals (or the groups of individuals in a leadership position 
with authority) in charge of interpreting and enforcing rules. In a world of vertical 
collectivism, paternalistic role expected from them and a large power distance in a 
hierarchical political and social structure allow the rule enforcers to use discretion more 
than in rules-based individualist societies.  




it be the values of yit, respectively, 
(i) dictated by the rule itself and (ii) considered appropriate collectively by the enforcers 
in a rule enforcement stage: e.g., police officer(s) in the case of highway patrol, tax 
administrator(s) for the enforcement of tax laws, or law enforcement official(s) in 
general.16 One may contrast the two cases as follows: 
                                                                                                 
15 In this case, depending on circumstances, either (i) the rule itself may entirely reflect the tyrant’s view, 
and both uit and eit may be zero or (ii) there may not be a rule, and uit and eit may be arbitrarily 
determined by an unprincipled tyrant (a and b = 0). 
16 As shown later, rule enforcement may be a multi-stage process. There will be different primary 
enforcers. For simplicity, the discussion here assumes only one rule enforcer. This assumption will be 
later relaxed.   
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rule:    y
*
it = a + bxit  (2)  
rule enforcers’ intention:  y
**
it = a + bxit + uit  (3) 
In Equation (3), uit reflects the degree of the deviation (in what direction and to what 
extent) that, in the view of the rule enforcer(s), the outcome of the enforcement of a rule 
should differ from the outcome dictated by the rule for an agent i required to observe the 
rule. In Equation (3), uit may either reflect either the individual view of a sole enforcer 
or the collective view of enforcers (a) above.17 Starting with this, a rule enforcement 
process yields the final outcome (y
o
it) of the process and the final deviation (eit). Before 
presenting a model of this process, it is necessary to discuss the nature of uit and eit. 
Thus, in a simple case, a traffic police officer may be the sole enforcer of a speed limit. 
Even in this case, however, the officer not only forms his or her own view (uit), but also 
chooses to issue, or not issue, a ticket (i.e., determines eit) by internalizing the social 
optimization process. There may also be a simple administrative hearing, to which the 
driver caught for speeding may choose to take the case. This would involve other 
enforcers. In another case, the prime minister and the minister of finance in a country 
get involved in granting discretionary tax allowances to a firm. In still other case, the 
president, the minister of justice, and the attorney general, collectively, but as a 
hierarchy, may decide whether to indict a prominent politician in a politically-sensitive 
criminal case. 
An interesting, under-researched source of a nonzero uit and eit is cultural collectivism, 
which tolerates rule enforcers’ discretion and, in particular, authoritarianism and 
paternalism that are often found in a world of vertical collectivism. An authoritarian, 
paternalistic rule enforcer may put, or may be allowed to put, his or her view above the 
rule, not necessarily as a result of sinister intentions (although these are widespread), 
but of what he or she believes to be good intentions. 
Note the difference between eit and uit. The former reflects the outcome of rule 
enforcement; the latter the intentions of the rule enforcers, who in general are in a 
leadership position. In a world of vertical collectivism, rule enforcers have authority, 
often tolerated by the members of society and, thus. inadequately checked and balanced, 
even in societies that have established democratic political institutions, quite often 
imported from abroad. 
A main difference between a rule of law and a rule of man is that the variances of e’s in 
the former are smaller than the variances of e’s in the latter. This hypothesis will be 
formally formulated and will be tested later in this paper. Whether the variances of u’s 
are necessarily smaller in the former than the latter is not immediately obvious. On the 
one hand, individualist values imply diverse opinions and views among individuals and 
thus may allow a variety of views on how a rule should be enforced. On the other hand, 
a culture of discretion may allow member of a collectivist society to have a larger u. 
                                                                                                 
17 The deviation u may reflect the views of all enforcers when there are more than one. Thus, in a 
criminal case, u would reflect collective judgement of a prosecutor and a judge, while e reflects the 
final outcome of the rule enforcement process. Prosecutors and judges may have similar u’s in a 
routine criminal case even in a collectivist society, but may have sharply different u’s in a politically 
sensitive, controversial case. The value of u in such a case will reflect an average of u’s of all rule 
enforcers.   
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Therefore, there is no reason to believe that u’s would be larger in a collectivist society, 
where discretionary rule enforcement is widespread, than in an individualist society, 
where rules-based rule enforcement is well established.  
A president, a judge, or a tax administrator in a rules-based, individualist society may 
have a personal or professional view that implies as large u’s in the enforcement of a 
country’s constitution, criminal law, or tax law as his or her counterpart in a discretion-
based, collectivist society. The difference between a rules-based society and a 
discretion-based society is that the system (a tradition of a rule of law, based on 
individualist values and a system of checks and balances) in the former ensures small 
e’s (but not necessarily small u’s), while this is not the case in the latter.18 
While there is no presumption that the variances of u’s should differ between 
individualist and collectivist worlds, the variances of u’s may differ between legal 
professionals and the public in general, or between judicial branch personnel (e.g., 
judges), who are trained law enforcement experts, and others who participate in law 
enforcement as members of members of a jury or of a pressure group. 
3.2  Rule enforcement as a social optimization process  
How does a society (e.g., an individualist one), given a large uit, ends up with an 
outcome that implies a small eit? How does a society (e.g., a collectivist one) end up 
with an outcome that implies a large eit?  
Objective function 
To model a rule enforcement process, one can postulate that a society, through 
interactions among different groups and individuals, tries to minimize the social costs 
arising from two factors: by how much the final outcome deviates from (i) the rule and 
(ii) the intentions of the rule enforcer (in a simple case of one enforcer). Furthermore, 
one can also postulate that the cost function, which encapsulates the society’s shared 
values, is quadratic with respect to the two factors: 

















it, for agents, i = 1, 2, …, I, who are required to observed a rule, 
represents by how much the outcome of rule enforcement deviates from what the rule 




it, represents by how much the outcome of rule 
enforcement deviates from the outcome desired by the rule enforcer. The model 
                                                                                                 
18 For example, during the 1960 presidential campaign, John F. Kennedy said that, as President, he 
would uphold the US laws even if they are not in line with his Catholic faith. Similarly, during a 
Senate confirmation hearing, John Ashcroft promised that, as the Attorney General, he would enforce 
the US laws even if they were not in line with his conservative view. That Kennedy was elected and 
that Ashcroft was confirmed indicate that US non-Catholic voters and Democratic Senators 
(particularly liberal ones) did not believe that Kennedy’s and Ashcroft’s personal views would 
significantly interfere in their law enforcement, respectively, as President and as Attorney General.  
19 An alternative way to set up the optimization problem would be set it up to minimize: Ct = Σi(1-θ)eit
2+ 
Σiθ(eit -uit)
2 with respect to eit. The solution would be the same.  
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postulates that the weights a society assigns to these two factors are determined by the 
society’s values. More specifically, θ ranges between two unrealistic extremes: 0 (pure 
collectivism, implying extreme discretion) and 1 (pure individualism, implying pure 
rules): 
θ   =   1 (collectivism)   
 =  0  (individualism)
 
Optimization 
In the model, through checks and balances, a society collectively chooses an outcome of 
rule enforcement for each i and t, by using y
o
it as the instrument to minimize C. For each 
t, the society, with a group of primary and other rule enforcers working on its behalf, 
determines the values of I instruments, y
o
it, i = 1, 2, …, I, to minimize C. The solution, 
for each i and each t, will be as follows: 
y
o
it  =   (1-θ)y*it + θy**it  (5) 
It is a fairly straightforward solution, with two special cases: (i) For a collectivist 
society under a pure rule of man, with θ = 1 (a maximum degree of discretion), 
Equation (5) becomes y
o
it = y**it. The outcome reflects the rule enforcer’s discretion to 
its fullest extent. (ii) For an individualist society under a pure rule of law, with θ = 0 (no 
discretion), Equation (5) becomes y
o
it = y*it. In this case, the outcome is pure rules.  
The model highlights the essential difference between a rule of law and a rule of man. A 
rule of law (or rules-based rule enforcement) is a system in which the rule enforcer’s 
rule enforcement activities are bound by a tradition of placing the rule above the rule 
enforcer’s discretion (Madison’s vision). A rule of man is a system in which the rule 
enforcers tend to put their views above the rule either because they feel that their 
deviations tend to promote public interests or because they want to promote their own 
personal gains. An extreme case would be the case of ‘I am the law’. 
3.3  Extensions—a model of multi-stage rule enforcement  
This model, while highlighting the essential differences between rules and discretion, is 
too simple to capture rule enforcement in practice. It presumes that rule enforcement is 
a one-step process that involves one enforcer or one group of enforcers. There are cases 
that can be represented by this simple model. In many cases in reality, however, the 
enforcement of a tax law or a criminal justice system directly involves many individuals 
and/or groups in more than one step. 
Rule enforcement in practice 
For example, a dispute arising from regulatory enforcement may proceed as follows: 
a)  The regulatory officials in charge of judging the case would decide whether it 
should be resolved administratively or be brought for criminal prosecution. 
b)  If the administrators decide to proceed for prosecution, the prosecutors would 
decide whether the case should be brought to the court.  
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c)  The court would be in charge of the trial. Judges (and juries) would be 
involved. The case might go to higher courts. In a federal system of 
government, the case might go through local, provincial, and federal courts. 
In each stage, each of the rule enforcers (e.g., regulators, prosecutors, and/or judges) 
would form their views that can be represented by Equation (3). In another example, 
death sentence cases may go to the office of president or to provincial chief executive 
(e.g., a state governor in the United States).  
The final outcome in each step will be shaped by a mixture of rule enforcers’ 
convictions and social values. In rules-based societies, rule enforcers, even with large uit, 
tie their hands, voluntarily or through a system of checks and balances embedded into 
the rule enforcement system that reflects their shared values, and allows the final 
outcomes to be faithful to the rules. They do not necessarily change their uit. 
If the rule enforcer in each of the above stages is a group (e.g., tax administrator, 
prosecutor, and judge), rather than individuals, uit will reflect the collective view (e.g., a 
weighted average) of the group, which would produce a formal or informal leader. 
This simple model lends itself to some theoretical extensions and empirical tests. A 
theoretical extension may proceed as follows: 
An extended model 
The model may incorporate some of the elements listed in the preceding section to 
highlight the essential features of discretionary rule enforcement in practice. For 
example, one may wish to build a more elaborate model to reflect the realistic features 
of multi-stage rule enforcement processes: Rule enforcement in each stage involves 
enforcers and a collective θ. The values of u and θ, in principle, may vary through 
successive stages. In each stage, the rule enforcer (or enforcers) forms his or her u, and 
the optimization, based on a value of θ, will yield an outcome (e and, therefore, y
o). As 
rule enforcement goes through successive stages, the outcome may change as follows: 
First stage. The enforcer’s discretion is as follows: 
y
**
1it  =    y*it + u1it  (6)   
The first-stage optimization yields the following outcome: 
y
o
1it  =   (1-  θ1)y*it + θ1 y
**
1it  (7) 
 =  y*it + θ1u1it 
= y*it + e1it 
where θ1 is the value of θ assumed for the first-stage optimization20 and  
e1it =  θ1u1it 
                                                                                                 
20 Note that θ reflects shared values in a society, but may vary across individuals. The essential 
difference between individualist and collectivist societies is that members of the former tend to have 
the values of θ closer to 0 than the members of the latter, who tend to have those closer to 1.  
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This result needs some elaboration. This paper argues that, in a rule enforcement case in 
which individualist and collectivist societies have identical rules, rule enforcers under a 
rule of law (i.e., in the former) and under a rule of man (i.e., in the latter) behave 
differently. The values of u’s, as well as e’s, would obviously differ among enforcers 
within these societies, as well as between the societies. The essential difference between 
a rule of law and a rule of man is that the variances of e’s, reflecting the outcomes of 
social optimization processes, would be smaller in the former than in the latter, whereas 
the variances of u’s would not necessarily differ between the societies. The following 
hypothetical example illustrates this point: 
A junior police officer, in the middle of the night, catches a drunken driver, who turns 
out to be their boss, the chief of a small precinct in a metropolitan police department. 
The chief’s car had a near-collision with another car, driven by a mutual friend. The 
chief, with perfect career records in the department and in line for a promotion shortly, 
got drunk after having severely reprimanded another police officer with a strong 
professional record for a rare, but severe misjudgement.  
Suppose two junior police officers in two different societies confronted this case. 
Suppose traffic rules in both societies required the officers to issue two tickets to the 
chiefs on two counts, drunken and reckless driving. This means that xit is sufficiently 
large to yield the value of y
o
1i to trigger 1 (to issue a ticket), not 0 (no ticket) on both 
counts. The model predicts that the officer under a rule of law would be likely to issue 
two tickets, but the officer under a rule of man might not issue a ticket at all or issue 
only one ticket, for example, for drunken driving, but not for reckless driving.  
That is, in the context of the model, the police officers would internalize the 
optimization processes in their respective societies, ending up with different verdicts, 
even if they might have begun the rule enforcement processes with either similarly large 
initial positive u’s, reflecting their judgement that the case is serious enough, or large 
negative u’s (for not issuing a ticket), reflecting a number of mitigating factors for their 
respective chiefs (the unblemished records, difficult decision with regard to his 
subordinate, no injuries or property damage, etc.). The two police officers would be 
guided by different values in their professional judgement and would possibly face 
different informal and formal sanctions for their actions. The former might expect 
sanctions for not issuing two tickets, the latter sanctions in an opposite direction for 
being too harsh to his boss with unblemished record. In this case, when they faced 
institutionalized second-stage enforcement procedures, they would expect different 
outcomes from each other, the former a rules-based outcome, the latter an outcome 
more sympathetic to the precinct chief. This might also affect their courses of action. 
Second stage. The rule enforcer’s discretion will be 
y
**
2it  =    y*it +δ1e1it + (1-δ1) u2it   (8) 
  =  y*it +δ1θ1u1it + (1-δ1) u2it 
Equation (8) assumes that the second-stage enforcer’s preferred deviation from the rule 
is a weighted average of his or her deviation (u2it) and the deviation (θ1u1it) resulting as 
the outcome of the first-stage optimization. This formulation reflects the practice in both 
individualist and collectivist worlds. For example, prosecutors, when appealing their 
case to a higher court, will inevitably reflect on the lower court verdict.  
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To illustrate, one can continue to use the case of precinct police chiefs in two different 
societies in the preceding example. Suppose both chiefs decided to appeal to their 
respective internal tribunals, claiming that he should be treated more leniently because 
of all the mitigating factors.21 Suppose the respective police departments selected, for 
the tribunals, senior officers to represent the junior officers who handled the case in the 
preceding stage and other senior officers to preside over the tribunals. In each of the two 
precincts in two different societies, the junior officer and the senior officers would have 
their own views, which would yield u2 and δ1θ1u1 + (1-δ1) u2, drawing on the junior 
officer’s verdict θ1u1 and their shared δ1. The final outcome would reflect not 
necessarily their own views, but their own view of what is acceptable. 
Criminal cases involving prosecutors would follow similar stages. There would be a 
first-stage enforcement process involving the enforcers (prosecutors, judges), who 
would form u1, and others (a defendant, defence attorneys, pressure groups), who would 
contribute to the final first-stage verdict (e1). When either side decides to appeal the 
verdict, there would be a new group of (most likely) more senior enforcers (a group of 
senior prosecutors, but possibly including all or some of the prosecutors involved in the 
first-stage enforcement process) who, together with other second-stage enforcers, would 
form a new u2, and so forth.  




2it  =   (1-  θ2)y*it + θ2 y
**
2it  (9) 
 =  (1-  θ2)y*it + θ2[y*it + δ1θ1u1it + (1-δ1) u2it] 
 =  y*it + δ1θ1 θ2u1it + (1-δ1)θ2u2it 
 =  y*it + e2it 
where 
e2it  =  δ1θ1 θ2u1it + (1-δ1)θ2u2it 
The value of δ would range between 0 (in a vertically-oriented society) and 0.5 
(horizontally-oriented society). 
Third-stage. If the case goes through one additional step, the outcome will be: 
y
o
3it  =   y*it + δ1δ2 θ1θ2 θ3 u1it + (1-δ1)δ2 θ2θ3 u2it + (1-δ2)θ3u3it  (10) 
The outcome of rule enforcement in a multi-stage rule enforcement system reflects θ’s, 
δ’s, and u’s in successive stages. In particular, the outcome depends on the index of 
collectivism-individualism (θ) and the index of vertical-horizontal orientation (δ). The 
following are four special cases for possible outcomes at the Sth step (s = S): 
a) Pure  rules 
i)  θ = 0, δ= 0.5  horizontal orientation (a small power distance) 
y
o
Sit = y*it 
                                                                                                 
21 Here the junior officer in the collectivist society is assumed to have issued one ticket.   
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ii)  θ = 0, δ= 0  vertical orientation (a large power distance) 
 y
o
Sit = y*it 
b) Maximum  discretion 
i)  θ = 1, δ= 0.5  horizontal orientation 
 y
o
Sit  =  y*it +   weighted average of uSit, uS-1it, uS-2it, …., the weights 
starting with 0.5 for the last-stage enforcer, but declining 
exponentially 
ii)  θ = 1, δ= 0   vertical orientation 
 y
o
Sit  =  y*it + uSit 
In a pure rules-oriented (individualist) society, the outcome of rule enforcement reflects 
rules regardless of whether the society is horizontally oriented or vertically oriented. In 
a purely discretion-based (collectivist) society, horizontal orientation and vertical 
orientation make a difference. In the former, the discretion of the enforcers in 
successive rule enforcement stages matters; in the latter, the discretion of only the last 
stage enforcer matters.22 
Table 1 illustrates the results of multi-stage rule enforcement simulated for four 
different combinations: θ = 0.3, 0.7 and δ= 0.5, 0.1. Main features of the results, which 
yield some useful suggestions for designing a rule enforcement system, include the 
following: 
a)  Multi-stage rule enforcement tends to reduce, but does not eliminate discretion 
in rule enforcement outcomes in a collectivist society; 
b)  Independence of judgement of rule enforcers in a hierarchy of rule 
enforcement helps reduce the degree of discretion (the difference between the 
standard deviations of e’s in columns A and B); 
c)  Horizontal orientation tends to reduce the degree of discretion particularly 
when rule enforcers in successive stages form their views independently. 
Some of these results are inevitable results of cultural values. Collectivism tends to 
promote uniformity in attitude and values, consensus, and harmony, compared with 
diversity in attitude and values and contention. Rule enforcers with collectivist values at 
different rule enforcement stages may not be independent of each other in forming their 
views. This may be more pronounced in a vertically-oriented collectivist world than in 
an individualist world. For example, lower-stage rule enforcers in a hierarchical society 
may develop capacity to ‘read’ the minds of higher-level rule enforcers. The outcome of 
their rule enforcement may already reflect the view of higher-level enforcers even 
before the case arrives at the latter’s office. 
 
 
                                                                                                 
22 Note that a pure discretion-based enforcement in this paper means that the outcome of rule 
enforcement reflects the rule enforcers’ intentions unaltered, not that rules are totally disregarded.   
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Table 1 
Degree of discretion in multi-step rule enforcement 
under horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism 
  H  0.50        V  0.10       




 A B A  B 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
S=1   
 u1 u2 u3  u1 u2 u3
I 0.30  0.30   0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
C 0.70  0.70   0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
S=2   
 u1 u2 u3  u1 u2 u3
I 0.30  0.05 0.15   0.20 0.16 0.01 0.27 0.28 0.27
C 0.70  0.25 0.35   0.60 0.43 0.05 0.63 0.68 0.63
S=3   
 u1 u2 u3  u1 u2 u3
I 0.30  0.01 0.02 0.15  0.18 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.28 0.27
C 0.70  0.09 0.12 0.35  0.56 0.38 0.00 0.04 0.63 0.68 0.63
S=4   
 u1 u2 u3  u4 u1 u2 u3 u4
I 0.30  0.00 0.00 0.02  0.15 0.18 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.28 0.27
C 0.70  0.03 0.04 0.12  0.35 0.55 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.63 0.68 0.63
S=5   
 u1 u2 u3  u4 u5 u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
I 0.30  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.02 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.28 0.27
C 0.70  0.01 0.02 0.04  0.12 0.35 0.54 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.63 0.68 0.63
Notes: 
I = individualism; C = collectivism; H = horizontal orientation; V = vertical orientation; The numbers are 
coefficients of, respectively, u1, u2, u3, ….  
The outcome of rule enforcement, as described in Equations (7), (9), and (10) may be extended to 
cases of S = 4, … as follows: 
y
o
1it =   y*it + θ1u1it 
y
o
2it =   y*it + θ2θ1δ1u1it + θ2(1-δ1)u2it 
y
o
3it = y*it + θ3θ2θ1δ2δ1u1it + θ3θ2δ2(1-δ1)u2it + θ3(1-δ2)u3itS 
y
o
4t = y*it + θ4θ3θ2θ1δ3δ2δ1u1it + θ4θ3θ2 δ3δ2(1-δ1)u2it + θ4θ3δ3(1-δ2) u3it + θ4(1-δ3)u4it 
If θj’s and δj’s do not vary with j’s (θj = θ and δj = δ), the above expressions will be simplified as follows: 
y
o
1it =   y*it + θu1it 
y
o
2it =   y*it + θ
2δu1it + θ(1-δ) u2it  
y
o
3it = y*it + θ
3δ
2u1it + θ
2δ(1-δ)u2it + θ(1-δ)u3it 
The table reports, in columns (1)-(5), the coefficients for u’s for θ = 0.3 and 0.7 and δ = 0.5 and 0.1. 
The table also reports, in columns (6)-(7), the standard deviations of es’s (or θu1, θ
2δu1+(1-δ)u2, …) (s = 
1,2,…) for two cases in which: (A) us’s are identical (i.e., u1 = u2 = u3 …) and (B) us’s are independent. 
Both are not realistic in their pure form, but can highlight two contrasting cases: In the first case, rule 
enforcers in different stages have identical views; in the second case, rule enforcers’ views are totally 
uncorrelated. In the first case, rule enforcers in different stages form their views in unison. In the 
second, they form their views independently, not influenced by each other. The standard deviations of 
es’s under these two extreme assumptions can highlight the extent to which the outcome of rule 
enforcement deviates from the rule itself.  
On the basis of the assumption that the standard deviations of u’s are the same for all s = 1, 2, .., S 
(i.e., σu1 = σu2  = σu3  … = σu), the results in columns (6)-(7) may be derived as follows for two cases a 
and b below, by using s =3 for illustration:                                                                   (notes continue)  
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Notes to Table 1 (con’t) 
y
o
3it    =  y*it + θ
3δ
2u1it + θ
2δ(1-δ)u2it + θ(1-δ)u3it 
a) If  u1it = u2it = u3it = u (the case in which the views of rule enforcers’ views are identical in all steps 
of rule enforcement). 
y
o
3it =  y*it + θ
3δ
2u + θ




2δ(1-δ) + θ(1-δ)]u  













2δ(1-δ) + θ(1-δ)]σu 
Column (6) reports the coefficient θ
3δ
2 + θ
2δ(1-δ) + θ(1-δ) in each of the four cases. 
b) If  u1it, u2it, and u3it (views of rule enforcers in various rule enforcement stages) are stochastically 






























0.5 in each of the four cases. 
 
   
 
Some of these results can provide useful suggestions for designing a rule enforcement 
system that restraints discretion in a collectivist society. For example, an increase in the 
number of stages will tend to reduce the degree of discretion, although the results in 
Table 1 indicate that the reduction in the degree of discretion tapers off rapidly after the 
second stage. Moreover, there can be institutional arrangements to make the outcomes 
of rule enforcement in different rule enforcement stages more independent. Such an 
effort in a hierarchical society should require elaborate arrangements aimed at 
institutionally protecting the independent judgement and independence of lower-stage 
rule enforcers. 
Relationship of the model to other models addressing discretion 
The existing studies on rules, in the tradition of studies of crimes by Becker (1968), 
generally focus on economic factors that affect rational individual agents reacting to 
existing rules. Many recent studies analyse the relationship between discretion and 
corruption. These studies point to rule enforcers’ opportunities to exercise discretion as 
a source of corruption. At the same time, these studies also note that given a chance, 
government officials might try to create opportunities to use discretion. A model along 
these lines has been aimed at establishing the factors that determine uit. 
The model in this paper, however, is aimed at identifying a broader set of factors that 
give rise to discretion in rule enforcement. It is not interested in finding out how u’s are 
determined for individual agents who are required to observe rules, but how societal 
values in different countries, over time, determine the magnitudes of the variances of 
the rule enforcement outcomes (see Tanzi 1998, for a discussion of a range of factors, 
including cultural aspects, of corruption). 
The existing models tend to recognize the possibilities to reduce discretion with proper 
short-run incentives or punishments, such as competitive wages for government 
officials and effective punishment for illegal acts. The model in this paper, however, 
suggests that the phenomenon of discretion in rule enforcement is much more deeply 
ingrained in a culture. Short-run solutions relying on models taking into account largely 
pecuniary factors to promote nondiscretion may not reach the heart of the problem. An  
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extensive study of corruption in the tax administration authorities in Tanzania and 
Uganda notes ‘cultural logics’ of corruption (Fjeldstad, Kolstad and Lange 2003). 
4  Values and rules: cross-country tests 
The model presented in the preceding section provides a basis for empirically testing 
whether collectivism does engender discretion. To this end, a statistical test may 
proceed as follows: Suppose one wants to use the model to test the hypothesis that 
values indeed shape the outcome of rule enforcement. One can use Equations (7), (9), 
(10), … to formulate testable equations. 
a)  For the case of S =1, subtract y
*











e1it  =  θu1it 
By assuming that eit and uit both have zero mean,23 squaring both sides of the equation, 
taking their expected values, and obtaining their square roots, one obtains 
[E(e
2)]
1/2 =    θE[(u
2)]
1/2 (12) 
or  σe  =  θσu   
or  σe  =  σuθ 
In carrying out these operations, one assumes that e and u are random variables over the 
space of all i’s and that θ, which is the same for all rule enforcers in a country, is a 
constant. This assumption does not strictly reflect the world as described in the 
preceding sections, which have stated that θ’s may vary across individuals in a society. 
Since θ’s reflect shared social values, however, this assumption, which was abandoned 
for theoretical analysis, is useful and not unreasonable for statistical analysis, 
considering that variation of θ’s should be relatively small within a society, in 
comparison with across societies. 
b)  Deriving a testable equation for a multi-stage rule enforcement is somewhat 
more elaborate, but yields an equation in the form of Equation (12). For example, using 
Equation (9) for illustration to formulate an equation for S = 2, where s = 1, 2, …, S 
denotes rule enforcement stages, subtract y
*





it   =  δ1θ1θ2u1it + (1-δ1)θ2u2it (13)   
or e2it  =   δ1θ1θ2u1it + (1-δ1)θ2u2it 
Assume that θ1 = θ2 = θ, which reflects shared values in a society and that u1it and u2it 
have a same variance, σu
2; denote their coefficient of correlation as ρu12; and simplify 
the notation by denoting δ1 = δ. Then the variance σe
2 and the standard deviation σe of eit 
can be shown to be 
σe








                                                                                                 
23 The test does not depend crucially on this assumption, which can be relaxed.  
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and 
















vary across countries, as discussed in the preceding sections. The former reflects the 
outcome of rule enforcement, which in turn reflects different degrees of discretion in 
different societies; the latter can be shown to vary between 0 and 1 and may be proxied 
by θ under the following conditions, which are reasonably realistic: 
i)  ρu12 moves approximately linearly in line with θ, which ranges between 1 
(collectivist) and 0 (individualist), allowing one to write ρu12 = θ 
(approximately), 
ii)  θ =
 1-2δ, with δ, a power distance index ranging between 0 (maximal 
power distance or vertical orientation) and 0.5 (minimal power distance 
or horizontal orientation). In accordance with Hofstede’s findings, power 
distance is positively correlated with collectivism. 
In (i) above, the assumption that ρu12 is a (linear) positive function of θ means that 
individualist values allow the independence of opinions among rule enforcers, whereas 
collectivist values promote uniformity of opinions. 
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0.5   
may be approximated by Equation (12), which is also a testable equation for S = 2.24 
Equation (12) suggests that the degree of discretion in the outcome of rule enforcement 
(σe) is determined by θ (society’s collectivist tendency, i.e., to what extent, it practices a 
                                                                                                 






0.5. Simulations (i.e., calculating the values of τ for various 
values of θ in the range between 0 and 1, with the assumption that θ =
 1-2δ, suggest that θ is related to 
τ approximately as in θ = -m + nτ, where m is an increasing function of the number of stages. The 
second form of Equation (14) may be written as σe = τσu = [m/n + (1/n)θ]σu = (σum/n) + (σu /n)θ, 
which is in the form of Equation (15).  
20 
rule of man) and the degree of discretion desired by rule enforcers (σu). For a given σu, a 
large  θ (a fraction close to 1) in a collectivist society would make the degree of 
discretion in rule enforcement outcomes relatively large, but a small θ (close to 0) in an 
individualist society would make the degree of discretion in the outcome of rule 
enforcement relatively small. 
Suppose one wants to use the model to test whether different θj’s (where j is the country 
subscript) in different countries affect σej, the degree of discretion reflecting the 
outcomes of rule enforcement in different countries with different degrees of collectivist 
values. To this end, one can compile data on σej for specific rules in a sample of 
countries.  
a)  For example, to analyse how a corporate tax law is enforced, one can collect 
data on the actual tax payments (y
o) of individual corporations (these payments 
would reflect discretionary exemptions, etc.) and compare them with their 
legal tax obligations (y
*),25 taking into account legally recognized adjustments 
to them. The variances for the countries of the differences between the two 
amounts for different corporations could form a set of data on σej, which can be 
regressed on a set of data on θj for the sample countries.26 
b)  To test cross-country differences of how judges observe a sentencing rule, one 
can compile data on judges’ sentences (e.g., the lengths of prison terms) for a 
convicted crime (e.g., murder) committed in similar circumstances and 
compare them with the sentences suggested in the sentencing rule (or 
guidelines). These data, if compiled across countries, would form a basis for 
cross-country comparison of degrees of discretion. 
c)  A test may also be based on aggregate data. Measures of overall degree of 
discretion across countries may be regressed on measures of individualism-
collectivism (see below). 
This approach will yield an estimate of σu. If, contrary to the assumed stability (or 
constancy in a special case) of σe’s cross countries, σe’s vary widely (relative to the 
variation of θj) across countries, the estimation may not yield a high goodness of fit. 
This paper uses cross-country data on indices of the rule of law, judicial independence, 
and soundness of property rights, as published annually in the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Reports. These indices, based on opinion surveys, can 
be alternative proxies for a measure of discretion. Chu (2003) reports the econometric 
results for an equation similar to Equation (15). In addition to the rule of law equation 
(Equation (15a) below), this paper reports results for two more equations 
(Equations (15b) and (15c) below): 
hj =  g0 + g1zj  (15) 
                                                                                                 
25 The point of getting these data is to highlight the differences between legal tax obligations and actual 
payments reflecting discretion. While these data may not be easy to collect, proxies may be obtained. 
26 The difference between y
o and y
* may be difficult to compile in practice, since tax administrators 
would have all the formal justifications for arriving at y
o. Unless a researcher can rely on professional 
experts to determine the amount of y
* corresponding to each y
o, one can use an opinion survey on the 
extent of discretion in the administration of the corporate income tax law.   
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where  
hj  =    ranging between 1 (least effective) and 6 (most effective) and 
  defined, for Equations (15a), (15b), and (15c), as follows: 
a)  Equation (15a): index of the rule of law, i.e., an average of the 
World Economic Forum (WEF 2000-01) indices of predictability 
of rules, judicial independence, and integrity of property rights, 
b)  Equation (15b): index of judicial independence, i.e., WEF 
(2001-02) index of judicial independence; and 
c)  Equation (15c): index of soundness of property rights, i.e., WEF 
(2001-02) index of the soundness of property rights 
zj  =  ranging between 0 (least individualist) and 100 (most 
 individualist), 
which are defined to be inversely related to σej (which increases as the degree of 
discretion rises and as hj declines) and θj (which reaches 1 with an extreme collectivism 
and rises as zj falls),27 and 
g0, g1 =  coefficients 
The series used for θ are drawn form Hofstede’s measure of individualism-collectivism. 
The data on h’s and θ’s are two different data sets, constructed independently and 
compiled independently at different times and on the opinions of different respondents. 
The estimation results are as follows: 
a) hj  =  3.659   +   0.034zj   adj.  R
2 = 0.581 
     (15.22)      (7.60) 
b) hj   =  3.117  +  0.041zj   adj.  R
2 = 0.556 
     (9.790)    (6.98) 
c) hj =  4.437   0.023zj   adj. R
2 = 0.497 
     (21.53)    (6.21) 
The estimation results are unambiguous—the degree of individualism affects the decree 
of rules-based system of law. The h and z data are independently compiled. That they 
have such a robust statistical correlation cannot be chance results. 
5  Institutional arrangements for nondiscretionary rule enforcement 
An aim of democratic institutions is to separate law-making functions from law-
enforcement functions and to establish checks and balance between the two. This 
                                                                                                 
27 Therefore, both Equations (12) and (15) should yield a positive estimate of the coefficient for the 
right-hand variable. That is, in Equation (12), a higher index of collectivism (θ) causes a higher degree 
of discretion (σe). In Equation (15), a higher index of individualism (zj) causes a higher index of the 
rule of law, judicial independence, and soundness of property rights (hj), which means a lower degree 
of discretion. The two equations, based on the dependent and explanatory variables constructed 
differently, explain a same causal relationship.  
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enhances nondiscretionary law enforcement. More generally, since rules (including laws, 
policies, government decrees) are broader in scope than laws, separation of rule making 
and rule enforcing and making the process of rule enforcement not subject to political 
and other interferences would be necessary for nondiscretionary rule enforcement. A 
government can demonstrate a commitment to rules by enforcing the rules consistently 
and nondiscretionarily by subjecting itself to ‘a set of rules that do not permit leeway for 
violating commitments’ (North and Weingast 1996: 803). This very condition is not 
easy to fulfil in a collectivist society. As shown in an earlier section, however, adding a 
limited number of layers of rule enforcement stages and making them autonomous and 
independent, in principle, would be helpful. 
5.1  Role of a multi-stage rule enforcement system with separation of powers 
Both separation of powers and multi-stage rule enforcement tend to reduce chances of 
discretion. In the context of Equation (10), if the first- and the second-stage enforcement 
procedures take place in the executive branch, a multi-stage rule enforcement could 
mean a separate formation of u1it and u2it; separation of powers could mean a separate 
formation of u3it from either u1it or u2it. The principles of separation of powers may be 
used not only between different branches of government, but also within a government 
branch. 
Two-stage rule enforcement 
Equation (10) could be the final outcome of two-stage rule enforcement in the executive 
branch and one-stage rule enforcement in the judicial branch: 
y
o
3it  =   y*it + θ3 δ2 [δ1 θ1θ2u1it + (1-δ1)θ2u2it]+ θ3[(1-δ2)u3it] (10) 
 =  y*it + e3it 
The degree of discretion δ1θ1θ2u1it + (1-δ1)θ2u2it in the first set of brackets represents the 
rule enforcement outcome in the executive branch (i.e., e2it); e3it represents the final 
outcome that emerges at the end of the judicial process. 
Effects of a two-stage, compared with a one-stage, rule enforcement system in the 
executive branch may be shown by comparing the following two terms in the first set of 
brackets [   ] in Equation (10): 
i)  θ1u1it  (16) 
ii)  δ1θ1θ2u1it + (1-δ1)θ2u2it 
with their respective variances as 
i)  θ1
2σu1















2, and σu12, respectively, are the variances of u1it  and u2it and the 
covariance between u1it and u2it. 
There are a number of cases of interest with regard to the implications of different rule 
enforcement systems in a collectivist society (i.e., where θ’s are large and close to 1):  
23 
a)  If it is horizontally orientated (e.g., with δ1 = 0.5), the degrees of discretion of 
the final outcome will reflect the views of the rule enforcers in both stages, 
with a smaller weight for the degree of discretion in the first stage than that for 
the degree of discretion in the second stage. If it is vertically orientated (δ1 =1), 
however, the degree of discretion will reflect only that of the second-stage 
enforcer, who will have a more authority than the first-stage enforcer. 
b)  For the outcome of a two-stage rule enforcement system to be less 
discretionary than that of a one-stage rule enforcement system, the second 
variance should be smaller than the first variance in Equation (17). On the 
simplifying assumption that σu1
2 = σu2
2 = σu
2 and that (to drop the unnecessary 
subscript) δ1 = δ, this condition becomes the following inequality: 
[(1-δ) + (1-δθ
2)] - (1-δ)θρu12 > 0  (18) 
where ρu12 = correlation coefficient between u1 and u2.  
This result is important for highlighting the role of a multi-stage rule enforcement 
system. In Equation (18), which is an inequality, the left-hand side ranges between 1 
(when  δ = 0, θ = 1, and ρu12 = 1, implying, respectively, vertical orientation, 
collectivism, and uniform views) and 1.5 (when δ = 0.5, θ = 0, and ρu12 = 0, implying 
horizontal orientation, individualism, and independence of views). The parameters 1-δ, 
θ, and ρu12 cannot exceed 1 even in the most extreme case of collectivism (vertical 
orientation, and group thinking) among rule enforcers. Even in this most extreme case, 
the inequality is satisfied, and a two-stage rule enforcement system would yield a 
smaller degree of discretion than a one-stage system does.  
The result also indicates, however, that, under the assumed conditions, adding a second-
layer of rule enforcement stage would reduce the degree of discretion more in 
individualist societies with horizontal orientation than in collectivist societies with 
vertical orientation. A reduced degree of collectivism, of vertical orientation, and of 
unity of views among rule enforcers would further reduce the degree of discretion. But 
these are cultural parameters and not independent of each other. For example, for a 
collectivist society to reduce ρu12 close to zero without a cultural evolution would not be 
easy, although some institutional arrangements could help the society achieve some 
reduction in ρu12. Note also that a gradual reduction in ρu12 resulting from changes in 
values would bring about a greater degree of horizontal orientation (i.e., an increase in δ 
toward 0.5). This interdependence does not allow one to assess the effect of a reduction 
in ρu12 under a ceteris paribus condition. 
Adding a second layer of enforcement, however, could increase the degree of discretion 
when, contrary to the assumption for the preceding conclusion, σu1
2  and  σu2
2 are 
different and σu2
2 is significantly larger than σu1
2. 
Separation of powers in rule enforcement 
How does separation of powers contribute to a reduction in the degree of discretion? 
Let’s go back to Equation (10): 
y
o
3it  =   y*it + θ3δ2[δ1θ1θ2u1it + (1-δ1)θ2u2it]+ θ3[(1-δ2)u3it] (10) 
 =  y*it + θ3δ2e2it + θ3[(1-δ2)u3it] = y*it + e3it  
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Suppose the executive branch brings the case with an outcome y
o
2it to the judicial 
branch. In the model, a group of third-stage enforcers, including a judge or a group of 
judges, form the value of u3 in the process of trial. The final outcome of the trial (e3) 
would emerge from optimization involving these enforcers, defence lawyers, a jury, and 
pressure groups if it is a criminal case. 
The degree of discretion in the outcome of rule enforcement under a system of 
separation of powers between the executive branch and a judicial branch may be 
compared with that in the executive branch outcome. This can be achieved by 
comparing the variances of the following two terms: 
δ1θ1θ2u1it + (1-δ1)θ2u2it = e2it  (19) 
θ3δ2[δ1θ1θ2u1it + (1-δ1)θ2u2it]+ θ3[(1-δ2)u3it] = θ3δ2e2it + θ3[(1-δ2)u3it] = e3it 













2, and σeu  
are, respectively, the variances of e2 and u3 and their covariance. On the basis of a 
simplification (to drop subscripts and to use σe2
2 to denote the variance of e of the 
executive branch and kσ
2 to denote the variance of u of the judicial branch): 
θ3
 = θ, δ2




where k = σu3
2/σe2
2 is the ratio between the degrees of discretion of the judicial branch 







2σeu > 0  (21) 








2σeu > 0  (22) 
The contribution of the judicial branch to a reduction in discretion works through two 
terms: 
θ




In the former, θ
2(1-2δ)k, a smallest possible k (e.g., a number close to zero), that is, a 
strict constructionist approach to rule enforcement of the judicial branch will maximize 
the value of the first term (which should be positive in this case) in Equation (22). In the 
latter, θ
2δ(1-δ)
2σeu, the separation of powers (and checks and balances) means that the 
judicial branch should be prepared to offset the executive branch’s undue discretion. 
This judicial role implies a negative value for σeu, which will make θ
2δ(1-δ)
2σeu negative 
and will enhance chances for the inequality in Equation (22) to be satisfied.  
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Vertical orientation means, however, that separation of powers may not be de facto 
effective for important political cases, although de jure institutions promise its 
effectiveness, particularly when a collectivist country has a powerful president or prime 
minister who towers over the judicial branch. 
Conditions for multi-stage rule enforcement to succeed in reducing discretion are a 
negative θρu12 and a negative σeu—the conditions not easy to satisfy with group-thinking 
tendencies in collectivist societies. 
5.2  Institutions for nondiscretionary rule enforcement: lessons of practice 
experiences 
This section assesses the ideas discussed in Chu (2003) in the context of the formal 
analytical results shown earlier in this paper.  
In a collectivist culture, nondiscretionary rule implementation has deep cultural roots. 
Threats to nondiscretionary rule implementation often come not only from the political 
party in power, but also from other social groups to which members of different 
government branches have regional or tribal ties.28 These informal ties weaken checks 
and balances intended in formal separation-of-powers principles. Rule implementation 
is also undermined by the fact that functions of the executive branch often encompass 
both rule making and rule implementing. Finance ministries—politicians in many 
cases—not only formulate rules (e.g., tax policy, budget, and regulatory measures), but 
also often implement them, although, in a formal sense, the real authority for their 
legislation belongs to the legislative branch. This makes it difficult to establish rule 
enforcement as a nonpoliticized function. 
Nondiscretionary rule enforcement: principles 
To ensure nondiscretionary rule implementation, the relations of rule-implementing 
agencies might be redefined vis-à-vis their rule-making counterparts. The following are 
a number of principles to this end: 
a)  Establish important rule-implementing functions as nonpoliticized, 
professional, and technical activities, separate from rule making. While neither 
possible in all cases nor easy, it seems feasible to isolate a set of critical rule-
implementing functions, such as those of (i) public prosecutors, (ii) tax 
administrators, (iii) regulators (e.g., in charge of antitrust, banking supervision), 
and (iv) budget implementers. While a rule-making agency should cooperate 
with a rule-implementing agency, it appears not essential for them to be part of 
a same agency.29 Separating rule enforcing functions (e.g., tax administration, 
                                                                                                 
28 Public choice theory suggests that an independent civil service can make it difficult for an elected 
government to pursue promised policies. (See for example Tullock 1987.) In countries with a 
collectivist culture, however, an excessive loyalty of bureaucrats to elected politicians can be a source 
of discretion in rule implementation. 
29 Separating rule making and rule implementing is a dimension that differs from seeking accountability 
through institutional pluralism, which involves decentralizing administrative functions through 
devolution, deconcentration, and delegation to lower levels of government and private sector partners. 
(See Cohen and Peterson 1999.)  
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budget execution) from rule-making ones (tax legislation, tax policy 
formulation, budget formulation) is essential to make them technical and not 
politicized. While it is necessary to strip rule-making agencies of rule 
enforcing functions, it is also critical to ensure that rule enforcing agencies do 
not interfere in rule making, which is essentially political. These two functions 
should be separate to the extent possible. When they are not separate, it is not 
possible to have a professional, technical head for rule enforcing functions. 
Contrary to this principle, many countries mix policy formulation functions 
with policy implementation functions under one head. Quite often, tax 
collection functions (enforcing tax laws) are under the control of the minister 
of finance, who is in charge of tax policy formation, which is a political 
function. 
b)  Ensure checks and balances.  These can be achieved by multi-stage 
enforcement and also by separation of powers in some cases. In a society 
dominated by collectivist values and a large power distance, tax administrators 
may be unduly loyal to those who appoint them. As head of tax collection 
agency, a minister of finance—a political appointee—would find it difficult to 
resist political pressure. Autonomous, nonpoliticized tax administration 
agencies would have greater chances of resisting the political pressure to use 
discretion in their administration of a tax policy regime.  
The preceding analysis shows why individualist societies have been able to develop a 
rule enforcement system that does not give rise to a high degree of discretion by using 
multi-stage rule enforcement and separation of powers. The analysis also shows how 
vertically-oriented collectivist societies might not be able to achieve a similarly low 
degree of discretion from a same formal multi-stage rule enforcement system. To 
benefit from these formal arrangements, the latter societies would have to add other 
features. It is not easy to specify such additional features in general terms. The 
following ideas, however, would be worthwhile to explore:30 
a)  Additional features should be aimed at minimizing chances for domination by 
higher-stage rule enforcers in vertically-oriented collectivist societies. Any 
features to this end would be easier to introduce into the system than to 
practice. The degree of difficulties would vary between routine rule 
enforcement activities at relatively lower levels and politically sensitive rule 
enforcement activities at higher levels. One possible idea would be to require a 
second-stage enforcement, if there is to be one, to be charged by an official to 
whom the first-stage primary enforcer does not normally report. For example, 
a tax official in the B region, with no personal ties with those involved in the 
first-stage proceedings, would handle the second-stage proceedings required 
for a tax case in the A region.  
b)  Additional features should also be aimed at minimizing the effects of group 
thinking. The analysis suggests that two independent views of two groups of 
two individuals are likely to contribute more effectively to a reduction in 
                                                                                                 
30 These ideas are obviously abstract and need to be developed into a detailed and concrete proposal. 
More importantly, for practical adoption, these ideas require ‘institutional entrepreneurs’, as discussed 
in Chu (2004).   
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discretion than one view that emerges from a group of four individuals. A jury 
system as it is practised in individualist countries, if introduced without 
additional features, might not be as effective as in collectivist countries, where 
members of a jury would deliberate on a case not as equals who speak their 
minds, but would tend to seek a cohesive group judgement. In such a case, 
rather than relying on one jury of 12 individuals, a modified system might rely 
on two juries, with six individuals each, to judge on a case independently, with 
either the final verdict to be made by, say, a presiding judge, or the final guilt 
verdict to require two independent guilt verdicts of the two juries. 
It is important, however, to hold autonomous rule-implementing agencies accountable. 
It is not easy to determine the degree to which central government rule-implementing 
agencies (e.g., prosecutors, tax administrators, regulators) chosen to be autonomous 
should be independent of those in charge of rule making. Should they be independent of 
ministers, the prime minister, or the president? Different countries would have different 
circumstances. A question is whether the possibility of rule-implementing officials’ 
abuse of autonomy is relatively more tolerable than the rule making elected officials’ 
abuse of power for their own political gains. 
Country experiences: an overview 
Separating rule making from rule implementing has received attention both in countries 
with an individualist culture and in those with a collectivist culture:  
a)  Many countries have a professional civil service, although its effectiveness 
varies across countries. The United States introduced the Civil Service 
Commission, now the Office of Personnel Management, in 1883 to replace the 
‘spoils system’ with a ‘merit system’.  
b)  New Zealand’s public expenditure management system is based on separating 
the role of ministers, who are responsible for policymaking, from the role of 
departmental chief executives, who are in charge of policy implementation 
(Scott 1996 and Lee 1995). This system may not work well in a collectivist 
culture, in which rule makers are likely to be a source of discretionary rule 
implementation.31 The basic approach, however, with some modifications, can 
be considered for developing countries.  
c)  In the new programme budget system in Brazil, a culturally collectivist country, 
a programme manager, who is in charge of implementing a budgeted 
programme, does not report to the line ministers who control the budgetary 
resources that are used as inputs for the programme. This system adds a layer 
of checks and balances in the process of budget execution, in addition to the 
one provided by parliamentary oversight.  
d)  A number of developed and developing countries have foreign nationals as 
heads of key policy implementing agencies (e.g., tax collection agency). A 
                                                                                                 
31 See Bale and Dale (1998) for the demanding conditions that must be satisfied for a successful New 
Zealand-type reform: (i) a consistent, comprehensive conceptual model, (ii) a clear performance 
definition, and (iii) a focus on what government does best. Schick (1998) suggests that a successful 
New Zealand-type reform should follow basic reforms to strengthen rules-based government.  
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number of African countries have established independent revenue authorities 
mandated with tax collection. Some have gone further, by inviting foreign rule 
enforcers, who are less likely to have personal ties with domestic interest 
groups.  
e)  Some others have used foreign commercial firms for certain aspects of 
customs administration (e.g., pre-shipment inspections). To an extent, these are 
aimed at enhancing nondiscretionary implementation of rules (e.g., tax laws, 
customs laws) by mandating those without ties to domestic interest groups to 
implement rules.32  
Rule enforcement functions as technical services 
Once a country establishes rule enforcing as well-defined activities separate from rule 
making, the country has a variety of approaches to reducing discretion in carrying out 
them. A government might consider unusual approaches, such as outsourcing some of 
these activities to private sector organizations and even to foreign organizations. Fiscal 
transparency requires that government clearly delineate the demarcation between the 
spheres of government and the rest of the economy. Conventional wisdom suggests that 
rule enforcing activities are governmental functions. However, a range of what used to 
be governmental functions or activities are now outsourced to private agents. For 
example, government does not necessarily purchase and distribute foodstuff to the 
designated recipients of the government social assistance programme that distributes 
food to the poor.  
Government must set the objectives of the programme, but does not have to deliver food 
to the poor. Similarly, government may outsource the operation of prisons to private 
agents. While government designs these programmes and set their objectives, it may 
outsource the well-defined activities involved in service delivery. Traditional wisdom is 
to consider public sector activities as sovereign, not subject to outsourcing to foreign 
agents, while private sectors, such as banking, manufacturing, and retailing can open up 
to foreign investment. Rule enforcing activities in the public sector, when they can be 
clearly delineated, can become technical functions that may be outsourced to either 
domestic or foreign agents whoever can carry out the functions most effectively at 
lowest possible costs. Inviting a foreign national without local ties to head a rule 
enforcing agency clearly is an idea that may be tried more extensively.33 
                                                                                                 
32 In a somewhat different context, but on the basis of similar principles, the Korean national soccer 
team improved its performance by hiring a foreign coach, who did not have local ties to interest 
groups, which had hampered the team’s effective functioning, by interfering in the team’s 
management.  
33 The asset of foreign rule implementers is their independence from domestic interest groups. Such an 
asset is useful not only for enforcing typical tax laws, regulations, and formulated budget, but also 
implementing some aspects of an agreed reform plan, in which domestic vested interest groups (e.g., 
not only specific industries, but also different ministries) might have divergent interests. As Addison 
(2003) suggests, foreign donors, in these cases, could help a country avoid getting stuck in a ‘partial 
reform equilibrium’.  
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Government functions as a set of transactions 
New institutional economics has given a new meaning to the firm as an organization. 
The new meaning allows economists to see what a firm does as a set of transactions, 
some of which the firm will continue to keep and the others it will outsource. If 
government functions are viewed as a set of transactions, guided by same principles in 
some respects as those governing markets and by different principles in some other 
respects, it is easy to see some rule enforcement functions may be outsourced. The 
following is a brief assessment of the Ugandan experience in this regard. 
Uganda Revenue Authority 
During the 1980s-90s, a number of African countries, including Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, 
and Tanzania, established national revenue authorities. An aim was to allow them to 
enforce tax laws as semi-autonomous agencies separate from the civil service, with 
higher remuneration and, thus with less incentives for corruption. 
Uganda established the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) in 1991 to enhance 
autonomy of tax collection. In 2001, the URA hired a foreign national, on a three-year 
contract, as its head (2001-04). Making the URA a semi-autonomous rule enforcement 
organization and appointing a foreign national to head the organization was a promising 
experiment. A contract with a clear set of result-oriented performance criteria would 
ensure how the outcome would be evaluated. 
The URA has remained separate from the Ugandan civil service, and its staff has 
enjoyed higher salaries than the civil service. While there has been initial confusion, the 
URA has move into tax administration (rule enforcement) and away from tax policy 
formulation (rule making). This movement has been in line with the suggestions in this 
paper. 
The experiment, however, has ended, perhaps prematurely, in the midst of confusion 
and controversies. The URA has not renewed the three-year contract with the expatriate 
commissioner-general, with some of the objectives remaining unfulfilled, in the view of 
the departing commissioner-general. The authorities are silent on how they view the 
outcome of the experiment and why the contract has not been renewed. Some 
assessments of this innovative experiment are available, although they are not focused 
on how successful the experiment was for nondiscretionary rule enforcement. While a 
thorough analysis of this experience in this regard would be useful, some of its initial 
lessons may be drawn. 
The URA has focused more on mobilizing revenue than on nondiscretionary rule 
enforcement. This revenue objective is clear in its mission statement, compared with, 
for example, that of the US International Revenue Service.34 
URA’s mission: 
Maximizing central government tax revenue while optimizing resources 
utilization by ensuring a fair and equitable tax administration with a 
highly motivated and professional staff. 
                                                                                                 
34 Their respective homepages: www.ugrevenue.com and www.irs.gov.  
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US IRS’s mission: 
Provide America’s taxpayers top quality service by helping them 
understand and meet their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax 
law with integrity and fairness to all. 
The URA’s focus on revenue maximization and fairness as a public policy aim is 
understandable. Its focus on reducing corruption, while not explicit in its mission 
statement, is also a crucial objective. It may also be true that in Uganda, a most effective 
way to maximizing revenue mobilization and reducing corruption is to promote 
rules-based tax administration and to reduce discretion.  
Revenue maximization, however, should be a policy objective—an objective that should 
be sought by rule-making government bodies. The role of URA as a rule enforcing 
agency should be to enforce tax laws as precisely, fairly, and efficiently as possible.  
A number of reports on the URA experience have suggested that URA’s revenue 
performances have been mixed: with a successful beginning, its revenue collections 
have since stagnated amid accusations of corruption. The URA management has 
prepared a corporate plan 2002/03-2006/07, aimed at raising the tax-to-GDP ratio from 
11-12 per cent at present to 24 per cent in 2006/07. 
The departing Commissioner-General, while suggesting that at present the URA has a 
potential of achieving 16 per cent of GDP, has noted that corruption is much more 
widely ingrained throughout URA than initially suggested. This assessment is in line 
with the findings that corruption and discretionary tax administration have cultural 
roots.35  
More fundamentally, the experience of rule enforcement in Africa in general and tax 
administration in particular, seems to suggest culturally-conditioned discrepancies 
between de jure rules and de facto rules. The following conclusion of a study reinforces 
the new institutional economics’ finding that imported formal institutions may not work 
as intended when they are not nested securely in hospitable informal norms. 
In Europe … the norms of the public service and the legal definitions of 
corruption correspond or harmonize, even if only appropriately, with the 
predominant socio-cultural logics. In Africa, on the contrary, there is a 
glaring discrepancy. As a result, the functioning of the administrative 
apparatus, entirely copied from the European pattern is a schizophrenic 
type. In law, official functioning, and budget, it is totally Western. In 
practice, it is otherwise, traversed by logics in drastic contradiction with 
the original model.36 
These findings stress the need to have a broader approach to understanding and 
improving institutions in general and rule enforcement in particular. 
                                                                                                 
35 See Section 7 on ‘Patronage and the ‘cultural logics’ of corruption’, in Fjeldstad, Kolstad and Lange 
(2003). 
36 Olivier de Sardan (1999), quoted in Fjeldstad, Kolstad and Lange (2003); Therkildsen (2003).  
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6  Summary and conclusions 
Discretion in rule enforcement in collectivist societies is a problem that these societies 
must confront to enhance their economic performances. It is not easy to make progress 
in this regard because discretion has cultural roots and because cultural values change 
slowly. 
This paper has presented a simple model that may be used to improve the understanding 
of how rule enforcement works in collectivist societies, where a rule of man is 
widespread, in comparison with how it works in individualist societies, where a rule of 
law tends to prevail. The paper has used the model to test the hypothesis that collectivist 
societies tend to be discretionary in rule enforcement in comparison with individualist 
societies. The test based on cross-country data supports the hypothesis. 
The analytical results show the importance of individualist values (which discourage 
group thinking and uniformity of judgement)—as a source of low discretion—
underpinning rule enforcement processes in countries where a rule of law prevails. The 
model shows exactly how separation of powers and multi-stage rule enforcement can 
reduce discretion. It also shows that, in the framework of the model in the paper, the 
number of stages does not have to be larger than two or three. 
The paper suggests that a collectivist country can reduce discretion by establishing rule 
enforcement as a separate process from rule making, by ensuring the independence of 
rule enforcement from political and other interferences, and by instituting a proper 
multi-stage rule enforcement system. Establishing key rule enforcement activities as 
separate functions is not only feasible, but is also essential to keep them from political 
and other interference. Since rule-making activities are, and should be, political by their 
nature, having a system in which rule making and rule enforcing belong to a same 
agency headed by a same person would inevitably give rise to chances of political 
interference and chances of discretion in rule enforcing. 
The paper uses the analytical framework to assess experiences aimed at establishing 
nondiscretionary rule enforcement systems, including the establishment of a 
nonpoliticized civil service, a result-oriented budget system, a programme budget, and a 
semi-autonomous revenue authority. Some countries with collectivist orientation are 
experimenting with independent revenue authorities mandated with revenue collection 
and headed by a foreign national. Considering that political pressure of vested interest 
groups who have personal ties with rule enforcers often are a primary source of 
discretion in rule enforcement in collectivist societies, a foreign national, with no 
personal ties with domestic interest groups and working with contracts with well-
designed performance criteria, is less likely to be receptive to such pressure. These 
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